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ABSTRACT
To ensure cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, agents may re-
quire prior commitments from others, subject to compensations
when defecting after agreeing to commit. Alternatively, agents may
prefer to behave reactively, without arranging prior commitments,
by simply punishing those who misbehave. These two mechanisms
have been shown to promote the emergence of cooperation, yet are
complementary in the way they aim to instigate cooperation. In
this work, using Evolutionary Game Theory, we describe a com-
putational model showing that there is a wide range of parameters
where the combined strategy is better than either strategy by itself,
leading to a significantly higher level of cooperation. Interestingly,
the improvement is most significant when the cost of arranging
commitments is sufficiently high and the penalty reaches a certain
threshold, thereby overcoming the weaknesses of both strategies.
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of explaining the evolution of cooperation have
been actively addressed in different fields of research, ranging from
Economics, Political Science, Biology to Artificial Intelligence and
Multi-agent Systems [9, 4, 6, 3, 8]. Various mechanisms, such as
direct and indirect reciprocity, kin and group selection, and net-
worked reciprocity have been proposed to explain the evolution of
cooperation (see a survey in [9]). Among these mechanisms, costly
punishment and commitments are those that can lead to the evo-
lution of cooperation in a one-shot interaction, and both of them
have been studied widely in the literature [4, 1, 8, 5, 7]. However,
a synergy of these two apparently complementary mechanisms has
never been studied before.
Commitment proposers force participants in a game to reveal
their intentions. Yet, even when co-players accept the commitment
and behave appropriately, they can still decide not to initiate such
agreements themselves as this is costly, and defect when no agree-
ment is established. Especially when the commitment cost is high,
this kind of free-riders, which benefit directly from the efforts of
commitment proposing strategies, can dominate [2, 5, 7], leading
to destruction of cooperation and social welfare.
Punishing strategies do not experience this problem. They can
effectively deal with these different types of free-riding players,
always punishing them even when no agreement was established.
Yet, costly punishment requires high efficiency or an excessive
effect-to-cost ratio to thrive [3, 5], which is not the case for commit-
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ment proposing strategies: Arranging a prior commitment regard-
ing the posterior compensation reduces the cost-to-impact ratio, as
was shown in [5].
As a consequence of these observations, we might expect that a
weighted combination of these two mutually complementary strate-
gies can lead to a better solution to deal with free-riding behaviors.
In the sequel we will show whether and when that is the case, within
the context of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma and using methods
of Evolutionary Game Theory, which are described in the next sec-
tion.
2. MODELS AND METHODS
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [9], a player can choose either to
cooperate (C) or defect (D). A player who chooses to cooperate
with someone who defects receives the sucker’s payoff S, whereas
the defecting player gains the temptation to defect, T . Mutual
cooperation (resp., defection) yields the reward R (resp., punish-
ment P) for both players. The PD is characterized by the ordering,
T > R > P > S, where in each interaction defection is the ratio-
nal choice but cooperation is the desired outcome.
Now, before playing the PD, a commitment strategy (denoted
by COMP), proposes to her co-player to commit to the game and
cooperate. To make the deal reliable, the proposer has to pay an
arrangement cost 1. If the co-player agrees with the deal, then
COMP assumes that the opponent will cooperate, yet there is no
guarantee that this will actually be the case. When the opponent
accepts the commitment though later does not cooperate, she has
to compensate the non-defaulting player at a personal cost δ1 [5].
Next to the traditional unconditional cooperators (C, who al-
ways commit when being proposed a commitment deal, cooper-
ate whenever the PD is played, but do not propose commitment
themselves) and unconditional cooperators (D, who do not accept
commitment, defect when the PD takes place, and do not propose
commitment), we consider two commitment free-riding strategies,
which have been shown to become dominant under certain condi-
tions in the one-shot PD situation [5]: (ii) Fake committers (FAKE),
who accept a commitment proposal yet do not cooperate whenever
the PD takes place. These players assume that they can exploit
the commitment proposing players without suffering the conse-
quences; (ii) Commitment free-riders (FREE), who defect unless
being proposed a commitment, which they then accept and cooper-
ate subsequently in the PD. In other words, these players are willing
to cooperate when a commitment is proposed but are not prepared
to pay the cost of setting it up.
We consider a well-mixed, finite population of a constant size
N , composed of those five strategies, i.e. COMP, C, FREE, D,
and FAKE. In each round, two random players are chosen from
the population for an interaction. For the row player, the (average)
payoff matrix reads
M1 =
0
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We consider now the costly punishment strategy, denoted by CP
[1, 8]. It behaves as a standard C player in the PD. But differently
from a C player, the CP player punishes the co-player, at a personal
cost 2, if she defects. That punishment consists in reducing the
defector’s payoff by δ2. Replacing COMP with CP in the previous
payoff matrix, we obtain a new payoff matrix, denoted by M2.
We now introduce a new strategy, denoted by CPP, that combines
COMP and CP in the following way. With probability q, CPP plays
the strategy COMP, and CP otherwise (i.e. with probability 1− q).
Except for the payoff when CPP player encounters another CPP
player, the payoff matrix in case of CPP reads
MCPP = q ×M1 + (1− q)×M2. (1)
The average payoff of a CPP player when playing with another CPP
player is:
(1− q)2R + (1− q)qR + q(1− q)(R− 1) + q2(R− 1/2).
Evolutionary dynamics.
We adopt a standard approach to implementing social learning or
imitation [8, 9]. Namely, at each time-step, one individual i with a
fitness fi is randomly chosen for behavioural revision. i will adopt
the strategy of a randomly chosen individual j with fitness fj with
a probability given by the Fermi function
“
1 + e−β(fj−fi)
”−1
,
where the quantity β controls the intensity of selection. Further-
more, we adopt the small mutation approach, i.e. a single mutant
in a monomorphic population will fixate or will become extinct
long before the occurrence of another mutation. This allows one to
describe the evolutionary dynamics of our population in terms of
a reduced Markov Chain of a size equal to the number of different
strategies (i.e. five in our model). The stationary distribution of the
Markov Chain characterises the average time the population spends
in each of these monomorphic states and can be computed analyt-
ically. Due to lack of space, we refer to the Method session in [5]
for a full description of the stationary distribution computation.
3. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
We compute the frequencies of the five strategies CPP, C, D,
FAKE and FREE as a function of q (see Figure 1a). We observe
that FAKE players can be restrained better as q increases – that is,
when commitment is used more frequent. On the other hand, the
FREE players are better coped with for smaller q, i.e. when pun-
ishment is used more frequent. This means that a balance between
arranging prior commitments and using reactive costly punishment
may provide a strategy that performs better than either strategy by
itself. Indeed, we observe that there is a large range of q where CPP
is better than both COMP and CP. Additional analysis shows this
observation is robust for other parameter values, including  and δ.
We now check what is the actual improvement, in terms of the
improved level of cooperation, that one may obtain with the com-
bined strategy. To that extent, we search for the optimal value of
q, at which CPP has the highest frequency for varying both  and
δ (Figure 1b). We observe a significant improvement compared
to the highest frequency of COMP and CP. The improvement is
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Figure 1: (a) Frequency of each strategy as a function of q, in
a population of five strategies CPP, C, D, FAKE and FREE.
For a large range of q, CPP has a higher frequency than both
the commitment proposing strategy COMP (i.e. CPP with q =
1) and the costly punishment strategy CP (i.e. CPP with q =
0). (b) Improvement in percentage of CPP in comparison to
maximum of CPP and CP. The payoffs being used are, T =
2, R = 1, P = 0, S = −1; β = 0.1; N = 100; 1 = 2 = ;
δ1 = δ2 = δ where  = 0.75 and δ = 5 in panel a.
most significant (even more than 100%) when δ reaches a certain
threshold. And interestingly, it occurs when the cost  is sufficiently
large, because in that case, the performance of COMP is severely
demolished. This is a notable observation since the performance of
the commitment strategy is demolished in the former case and the
performance of costly punishment is reduced in the latter one. As
such, our results have clearly shown that the combined strategy can
overcome the weaknesses of both strategy when using separately.
To conclude, we have shown that, although both commitment
and costly punishment might promote the evolution of cooperation
in the one-shot interaction setting, they can actually complement
each other to lead to a better combined solution that ensures a more
favorable outcome for cooperative behavior. As such, our work
provides important insights into the design of multi-agent systems,
whether they are self-organized or distributed, that make use of
commitments or costly punishment for regulation purposes.
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